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This thesis examines and compares a variety of methods for inerting the fuel 
tanks of civil transport aircraft.  These aircraft can range from the 50-seat Bombardier 
CRJ-200 to the 525-850 seat Superjumbo Airbus A380 and can also include airliner-
based VIP aircraft such as the Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) or executive-class aircraft 
such as the Learjet 85.   
Three system approaches to fuel tank inerting are presented in this paper with 
the intent of providing senior systems engineers and project managers a comparative 
requirements analysis and a thorough analysis of the different levels of documentation 
effort required for each rather than performing a simple technical trade-off study to 
determine which system architecture is the lowest weight or perhaps has the least parts 
count.   
When choosing a system architecture, requirements analysis is often overlooked 
and documentation workload is brushed aside in favor of purely technical analyses.  
This thesis paper aims to provide examples of why the non-technical analyses are also 








I began my avionics career as an aircraft 
electrical technician for the U.S. Navy in 1975.  After an 
honorable discharge I continued as a tech, then 
manager and finally Director of Avionics for Executive 
Jet Aviation (now NetJets).  In 1997 I moved to 
Honeywell Aerospace (Glendale, AZ) as an avionics 
systems engineer where I worked on a variety of new aircraft and flight control 
certification programs.  I left Honeywell in 2005 to pursue an independent consulting 
business in program management of airborne software development.  Most recently 
(July 2014) I finished 5 ½ years as an equipment manager & systems engineer with 
Parker Aerospace’s Fluid Systems Division in Irvine, CA.  Presently I am Director of 
Programs at Phoenix Logistics of Tempe, AZ which manufactures electronic 
assemblies and systems for military aircraft. 
• Avionics Engineering Technology: Columbus State – 1984 
• Electrical & Computer Engineering: Franklin University – 1995 
• MBA: Arizona State University – 2001 
• Project Management: University of Phoenix – 2005 
• MS Systems Engineering: Colorado State – December 2014 
• Project Management Professional – June 2008 
• Certified System Engineering Professional – January 2014 
iii 
 





AUTOBIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... iii 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
PROBLEM STATEMENT ................................................................................................ 9 
A COMPARISON OF THREE FTIS ARCHITECTURES ............................................... 11 
REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................. 14 
Bombardier Aerospace Requirements .......................................................................... 14 
System Requirements ................................................................................................... 16 
Requirements Trace Matrix ........................................................................................... 20 
Requirements Discussion .............................................................................................. 21 
USE CASE DIAGRAMS ................................................................................................ 23 
Use Case Summary ...................................................................................................... 28 
BLOCK DEFINITION DIAGRAMS ................................................................................. 32 
INTERNAL BLOCK DIAGRAMS ................................................................................... 36 
SYSTEM COMPLEXITY CONSIDERATIONS .............................................................. 39 
Safety Requirements ..................................................................................................... 39 
Development and Design Assurance Levels ................................................................. 44 
FDAL/IDAL Contribution to System Development Level of Effort .................................. 48 
iv 
 
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 54 
Customer Requirements Coverage ............................................................................... 54 
System Complexity........................................................................................................ 56 
Closing Remarks ........................................................................................................... 60 
Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 61 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 64 
APPENDIX A: ARP4754A PROCESS OBJECTIVES DATA AND SYSTEM CONTROL 
CATEGORIES ............................................................................................................... 68 
APPENDIX B: DO-178B PROCESS OBJECTIVES DATA AND CONTROL 
CATEGORIES ............................................................................................................... 77 
APPENDIX C: DO-254 HARDWARE LIFE CYCLE DATA AND HARDWARE CONTROL 









Table 1: System-level Requirements............................................................................. 17 
Table 2: Customer to System Requirement Tracing ..................................................... 20 
Table 3: FTIS Architecture #1: Onboard Storage – Requirements Summary ................ 28 
Table 4: FTIS Architecture #2: Bleed Air – Requirements Summary ............................ 30 
Table 5: FTIS Architecture #3: Compressor – Requirements Summary........................ 31 
Table 6: System Functional Hazard Assessment for an FTIS ....................................... 39 
Table 7: Failure Mode Criticality Definitions .................................................................. 45 
Table 8: Requirements Validation Methods and Data ................................................... 49 
Table 9: CM Activities to Control Category Mapping for ARP4754A ............................. 52 
Table 10: SCM Activities to Control Category Mapping for DO-178B ........................... 52 
Table 11: HCM Activities to Control Category Mapping for DO-254 .............................. 53 
Table 12: Customer Requirements Coverage by Architecture ...................................... 54 
Table 13: System Documentation Required per ARP4754A ......................................... 56 
Table 14: Software Documentation Required per DO-178B .......................................... 57 
Table 15: Hardware Documentation Required per DO-254 ........................................... 57 
Table 16: System Documentation Effort Required per ARP4754A ............................... 58 
Table 17: Software Documentation Effort Required per DO-178B ................................ 58 









Figure 1: Air Separation Module ...................................................................................... 4 
Figure 2: NASA Shuttle Carrier Aircraft ........................................................................... 5 
Figure 3: OBIGGS Installed in Boeing 747 SP Ground Test Article ................................ 6 
Figure 4: OBIGGS Installed in Airbus A320 Flight Test Vehicle ...................................... 7 
Figure 5: The Three FTIS Architectures ........................................................................ 13 
Figure 6: Use Case to Actor Relationship, per Holt & Perry .......................................... 24 
Figure 7: FTIS Architecture #1 Use Case Diagram: Onboard Storage .......................... 25 
Figure 8: FTIS Architecture #2 Use Case Diagram: Bleed Air ....................................... 26 
Figure 9: FTIS Architecture #3 Use Case Diagram: Compressor .................................. 27 
Figure 10: FTIS Architecture #1 Block Diagram: Onboard Storage ............................... 33 
Figure 11: FTIS Architecture #2 Block Diagram: Bleed Air ............................................ 34 
Figure 12: FTIS Architecture #3 Block Diagram: Compressor ....................................... 35 
Figure 13: FTIS Architecture #1 Internal Block Diagram: Onboard Storage .................. 36 
Figure 14: FTIS Architecture #2 Internal Block Diagram: Bleed Air ............................... 37 











On 17 July, 1996 a Boeing 747, Flight TWA 800, exploded in mid-air about 12 
minutes after take-off from John F. Kennedy airport.  The accident investigation, 
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB), concluded that instead of the suspected act of terrorism the 
incident was caused by the ignition of hot fuel vapors in the aircraft’s central fuel tank.  
According to the NTSB, the aircraft had been sitting on hot pavement for a few hours 
before the flight which was plenty of time to warm the central nearly empty, bottom-
mounted fuel tank to the temperature necessary for the fuel to vaporize.  Once the fuel 
tank was full of warm fuel/air vapors all that was necessary was a source of ignition, 
likely a short in the fuel quantity system electrical wiring, for the center fuel tank to 
explode.  All 230 persons on board perished in the catastrophe. 
A 1999 Department of Transportation & Federal Aviation Administration report 
(DOT/FAA/AR-99/73)1 studied 13 worldwide accidents involving fuel tank explosions 
during the period from 1966 to 1995.  The authors ran 9999 Monte Carlo iterations of 
random selections, finding a best estimate of 9 lives per year would be saved if the air 
transport fleet were equipped with fuel tank inerting.  An important assumption in the 
report is that all fuel tank explosions would have been prevented by the use of onboard 
inerting systems (unless fuel tanks are severely ruptured and nitrogen lost). 
1 DOT/FAA/AR-99/73: A Benefit Analysis for Nitrogen Inerting of Aircraft Fuel Tanks Against 
Ground Fire Explosion, Ray Cherry and Kevin Warren 
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According to a FAA Fact Sheet2, the TWA 800 accident “fundamentally altered 
the assumptions held by the FAA, airlines, manufacturers, and the NTSB.  Prior to the 
TWA 800 accident, the prevailing philosophy among the world’s aviation experts was 
that minimizing ignition sources was the best way to avoid a fuel tank explosion. 
However, the ignition source for the TWA 800 accident remains unknown.”  The Fact 
Sheet continues, declaring that now “The FAA is pursuing the right safety solution: 
eliminate ignition sources and reduce the flammability of the tank.”   
The TWA 800 incident prompted the NTSB to recommend new rules be enacted 
to reduce the likelihood of fuel tank explosions on commercial transport aircraft 
(airliners).  Following this recommendation the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
created Amendment 25-102 to Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 25.981 Fuel Tank 
Ignition Prevention, which requires “minimization of the formation of flammable vapors 
in the fuel tanks”3.  In essence, this amendment required a Fuel Tank Inerting System 
(FTIS) on all newly designed transport category aircraft, not including those carrying 
only cargo.   
The most practical method for reducing the flammable vapors in an aircraft’s fuel 
tank is to replace the oxygen in the space above the fuel’s surface, known as ullage, 
with a non-flammable gas such as Nitrogen.  In a 1971 report4 produced by the National 
Aviation Facilities Experimental Center (NAFEC), studies of nitrogen inerting 
requirements for the safety of aircraft fuel tanks from the previous 30 years were 
examined.  These studies had been performed by a wide variety of entities, including 
2 FAA Fact Sheet – Fuel Tank Safety, 29 June 2006 
3 FAA Advisory Circular 25.981-2A 
4 FAA-RD-71-42: Inerted Fuel Tank Oxygen Concentration Requirements 
2 
 
                                            
the Boeing Aircraft Company, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Mines, 
University of California, Naval Research Laboratory, Wright Aeronautical Development 
Center, Royal Aircraft Establishment and Convair Aircraft Company.  The NAFEC report 
describes the trade-off between two inerting gases, Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and Nitrogen 
(N2): CO2 has a higher volumetric heat capacity (Btu/ft3) so it is better at quenching 
flames than N2 but the purpose of a fuel tank inerting system is to prevent the 
occurrence of ullage ignition and consequently the flames will not exist.  Other 
observations made in the report were that although less CO2 is required to produce a 
nonflammable ullage, CO2 is heavier, requires a heavier compression container, has 
icing problems when released and is more soluble in fuel which can cause lower engine 
performance due to fuel dilution. 
A later NAFEC report5, released in 1972, describes the results of flight testing a 
liquid nitrogen inerting system onboard a FAA-operated DC-9 commercial transport 
plane.  The aircraft was thoroughly instrumented so that ullage pressures and oxygen 
concentrations could be measured at all locations within the wing fuel tanks and the 
center fuel tank, during all flight phases.  The inerting system was able to maintain a 
positive pressure in all three fuel tanks (left wing, center, and right wing) which, even at 
the ullages’ peak oxygen concentrations, kept all tanks well below the level considered 
inert and unable to support combustion. 
In an FAA technical paper authored by William Cavage and Robert Morrison of 
the FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center, Fire Safety Branch in Atlantic City6, an 
5 FAA-RD-72-53: Performance of a DC-9 Aircraft Liquid Nitrogen Fuel Tank System 




                                            
On-Board Inert Gas Generation System (OBIGGS) was studied as an alternative to the 
more weight-intensive method of utilizing liquid nitrogen.  The OBIGGS method was 
made possible by newly developed Hollow Fiber Membrane (HFM) technology which 
separates the Nitrogen and Oxygen molecules from a stream of ordinary atmospheric 
air.  After removing most of the Oxygen from the air stream the remaining Nitrogen-rich 
air is sent to the fuel tank(s) to create an inert ullage.  The HFMs are bundled tightly 
together inside a metal canister called an Air Separation Module (ASM) which is then 
connected to an air source.  Figure 1 is a simplified pictorial of an ASM, presented by 
Cavage & Morrison at an International Fire and Cabin Safety Research Conference, 
held in Lisbon, Portugal in 20047. 
 
Figure 1: Air Separation Module 
 
The Cavage & Morrison technical paper provides summary descriptions of a 
ground test installation aboard a decommissioned Boeing 747SP along with dynamic in-
7 Development and Testing of the FAA Simplified Fuel Tank Inerting System, a PowerPoint 
presentation by W.M. Cavage & R. Morrison 
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flight testing of an Airbus-supplied A320 and the NASA 747 Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
(SCA), shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: NASA Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
 
The inerting system as installed for ground testing is shown in Figure 3.  This 
view is from underneath, looking up at the belly of the aircraft where the installing 
engineers were fortunate to find adequate space available for the entire system.  The 
system installed in the NASA 747 SCA was virtually the same as that installed in the 




Figure 3: OBIGGS Installed in Boeing 747 SP Ground Test Article 
 
A very detailed description of the NASA 747 SCA inerting system installation, the 
flight tests performed, and the test results were published in an FAA report, also 
authored by Cavage & Morrison along with Michael Burns and Steven Summer8.  A 
similar FAA report9, with Burns, Cavage, Morrison, and Richard Hill as authors, covers 
the same type and depth of information for the A320 flight tests.   
On the Airbus A320 flight test vehicle, the inerting system was installed in the 
cargo bay, shown in Figure 4.   
8 DOT/FAA/AR-04/41: Evaluation of Fuel Tank Flammability and the FAA Inerting System on the 
NASA 747 SCA 




                                            
 
Figure 4: OBIGGS Installed in Airbus A320 Flight Test Vehicle 
 
All three installations utilized main engine bleed air for the ASM’s atmospheric air 
stream.  Ground testing validated the OBIGGS concept but ASM performance varied 
greatly with temperature, as warm HFMs separate out the Oxygen molecules more 
efficiently.  Flight tests of both the A320 and the 747 SCA also validated the OBIGGS 
and it was noted that pressure altitude had a much larger effect on bleed air 
consumption than was expected.  The paper suggested more research of HFMs would 
be necessary “to determine what changes in system design or operational methodology 
would best reduce the bleed air flow and the associated cost”. 
Military aircraft have long utilized the onboard storage method, typically with LN2 
or Halon.  In a 1987 SAE Technical Paper10 written for an Aerospace Technology 
10 SAE Technical Paper Series 871903: OBIGGS For Fighter Aircraft 
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Conference and Exposition, the recently-developed ASM technology (OBIGGS) was 
compared with existing onboard storage FTISs similar to those used on the F-15 fighter 
aircraft.  In the technical paper, R.G. Clodfelter of the Aero Propulsion Laboratory at 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, along with C.L. Anderson and W.L. Vannice of 
the Boeing Military Airplane Company in Seattle, Washington found the onboard 
storage method to remain the best for dealing with the typical fighter’s ability to make 
massive altitude changes, which was assumed to be a descent of 60,000 feet in 54 
seconds.  During a descent an aircraft’s fuel tanks’ inertness become spoiled by 
atmospheric air via the fuel venting system.  As the aircraft descends, atmospheric 
pressure outside the wing tanks increases and the fuel tanks “inhale” air containing 21% 
oxygen which quickly brings the ullage above the flammable level.  To meet a fighter 
aircraft’s need for inerting gas during such a maneuver a pure OBIGGS system would 
need to be extremely oversized, with many ASMs connected in parallel.   
Clodfelter, Anderson and Vannice suggested a hybrid OBIGGS/Onboard Storage 
system that would use a turbo-compressor in conjunction with the OBIGGS to store, 
during ascents and level cruising, enough compressed NEA to keep the fuel tanks inert 
during descents.  A commercial airliner’s typical descent rate is a fraction of a fighter 
aircraft, but a thorough FTIS sizing study may determine that adding a turbo-
compressor and a small storage tank may allow the removal of a few ASMs from the 









With an amended FAR requiring the fuel tanks on newly designed airliners be 
made inert, to prevent tragedies such as TWA 800, the airline manufacturers have been 
challenged to choose the optimum FTIS for their particular aircraft.  Unfortunately, 
adding such a system also adds weight and cost – each of which can be considered the 
bane of a successful aircraft design. 
The additional weight of an FTIS can easily be measured by totaling the system’s 
component weights plus any necessary aircraft physical interfaces such as mounting 
points.  The cost of adding an FTIS is not so easily determined and is always more than 
just the cost of components, due to the additional documentation.  Such documents 
include those typically produced for every system on board a transport category aircraft: 
system safety analyses; requirements databases at the manufacturer, system supplier, 
software developer, and component supplier levels; proof of requirement traceability 
and compliance evidence; individual component environmental qualification testing 
procedures and results; system environmental qualification testing procedures and 
results; proof of compliance with the Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics’ 
(RTCA) DO-178B and DO-254 processes for software and complex electronic hardware 
development and their related audits; test procedures and results for integrating the 
system with the aircraft; proof of compliance with the Society of Automotive Engineers’ 
ARP-4754A process for developing systems for airborne use; and a variety of 
certification documents determined by each aircraft manufacturer.  All of the 
documentation involved with developing an FTIS is also subject to review and approval 
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at one level above the aircraft manufacturer, by the certification authorities, which is the 
FAA or Transport Canada in North America, the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK and 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in the European Union. 
When the weight of the paper [documentation] equals the weight of the airplane, 
only then you can go flying. 
— attributed to Donald Douglas11 
With the uncertainty in arriving at a cost estimate for developing an FTIS, given 
the variables per aircraft manufacturer and various certification environments, this thesis 
paper will focus on system complexity as a basis for comparing costs.  Differing 
contractual requirements is another justification for this approach, as Airbus and Boeing 
may prefer to provide all aircraft flight testing equipment while Bombardier may require 




11 Great Aviation Quotes: http://www.skygod.com/quotes/flyingjokes.html 
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As noted in the Introduction, the most practical method for reducing the 
flammable vapors in an aircraft’s fuel tank is to replace the oxygen in the ullage with an 
easily obtained non-flammable gas such as Nitrogen.  This can be accomplished by 
either distributing the Nitrogen gas to the fuel tanks from storage tanks carried onboard 
the aircraft or from an onboard Nitrogen generator.   
For the storage onboard method, Nitrogen is generated at a ground facility and 
then pumped into the aircraft’s Liquid Nitrogen (LN2) storage tanks during ground 
servicing and this Nitrogen is distributed to the fuel tanks during aircraft operation.  For 
the onboard generator method, an Air Separation Module strips the Oxygen molecules 
from a stream of atmospheric air (consisting of 78% Nitrogen and 21% Oxygen), 
sending the Oxygen overboard as waste and the remaining Nitrogen to the fuel tanks. 
In this thesis paper the onboard storage method is identified as FTIS Architecture 
#1.  It is the least complex but the heaviest solution.  For FTIS Architecture #2 & #3, 
onboard Nitrogen generation is utilized with two very different methods of supplying the 
necessary atmospheric air.  FTIS Architecture #2 is connected to the aircraft’s engines 
for a supply of hot air bled from a mid-stage port on each engine’s casing, known as 
Bleed Air.  Bleed Air is also utilized by the wing anti-ice system and the cabin 
environmental control system, among others.  FTIS Architecture #3 is self-contained as 
it generates hot air with a FTIS-specific turbo compressor which is not shared with other 
aircraft systems.  FTIS Architecture #2 provides the aircraft with the least weight penalty 
but is the most complex.  FTIS Architecture #3 resides in a weight and complexity 
11 
 
position between the other two architectures.  A SysML Specialization diagram shows 
the three types of FTIS in Figure 5. 
Comparisons and evaluations of the three FTIS architectures includes Block 
Diagrams and Internal Block Diagrams utilizing SysML.  To illustrate compliance with 











Architecture #2 Architecture #3
 







The constraints, also known as controls per INCOSE (International Council On 
Systems Engineering), in the architecture design process for an FTIS are predominately 
related to the Federal Aviation Administration as FARs or Federal Aviation Regulations.  
Supporting the FARs are the two documents from the RTCA, DO-178B and DO-254, 
which describe the processes for developing airborne software and complex electronic 
hardware.  Also, from the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) is a document 
regulating the process for developing airborne systems, the SAE Aerospace 
Recommended Practice, Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems, 
ARP-4754A. 
The three competing FTIS architectures for this thesis paper will be developed 
per customer requirements from the Bombardier Aerospace (BA) company which builds 
air transport, regional, commuter and business aircraft.  BA provides enablers to the 
architecture design process such well-defined electrical, mechanical and pneumatic 
interface characteristics, plus the physical environment and user interface requirements.  
The following customer requirements are intended for a new aircraft development 
program referred to as the BA-500. 
Bombardier Aerospace Requirements 
BA-500-01: The FTIS shall ensure that the oxygen concentration in the fuel tank ullage 
is always below that required for certification. 
BA-500-02: The FTIS Supplier shall minimize and define the envelope into which the 
FTIS shall be installed. 
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BA-500-03: The FTIS shall not present an undue load to the air generation subsystem. 
BA-500-04: The FTIS shall be capable of providing NEA during any aircraft operating 
phase. 
BA-500-05: The FTIS shall be designed to provide a compact system to fit within an 
area between the fuel tank and the aircraft Belly Fairing. 
BA-500-06: The FTIS shall not expose the aircraft to any catastrophic failure modes 
not demonstrated to have a probability of 10-9 or less. 
BA-500-07: The FTIS system Guaranteed Not to Exceed Weight (GNTEW) shall not 
exceed 75 lbs dry weight (structures mounting bracketry not included). 
BA-500-08: The FTIS system is to be sized to satisfy a minimum performance growth 
provision of 15%. 
BA-500-09: Vibration levels introduced by the FTIS into the Aircraft structure shall be 
kept as low as practical in order to limit structural vibration and/or cabin 
noise. 
BA-500-10: The NEA delivered by the FTIS shall not contain self-generated 
contaminants greater than those specified in FAR25.831, ‘Ventilation’. 
BA-500-11: The FTIS waste exhaust shall be designed to safely discharge O2 
enriched air, water drainage or heat exchanger air in a manner safe for 
personnel working around or servicing the aircraft. 
BA-500-12: The FTIS shall be controlled by solid-state devices. 
BA-500-13: The FTIS shall be capable of unattended operation. 
BA-500-14: The FTIS shall provide NEA to maintain the fuel tank in a non-flammable 
(inert) condition throughout all normal flight and ground conditions. 
15 
 
BA-500-15: The FTIS system shall provide nitrogen enriched air (NEA) to maintain a 
non-flammable mixture of air and fuel vapors in the fuels tank, in 
accordance with certification regulations 
System Requirements 
The development of system architecture and the allocation of customer high-level 
requirements to system requirements is governed by Section 4.4 of ARP4754A12: “The 
system architecture establishes the structure and boundaries within which specific item 
designs are implemented to meet the established requirements.  More than one 
candidate system architecture may be considered for implementation."  The SAE 
document continues to describe the importance of fully and accurately developing 
system requirements from the allocated customer requirements: “The decomposition 
and allocation of requirements to items should also ensure that the item can be shown 
to fully implement the allocated requirements.  The process is complete when all 
requirements can be accommodated within the final architecture.”  Table 1 shows the 
system-level requirements that have been decomposed from the customer’s high-level 
requirements along with their traceability to the high-level requirements. 
Note: In this Systems Requirement Document, the FTIS will be identified as “the 
system”. 
.
12 SAE Aerospace ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
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Tracing and Notes 
FTIS-001 The system shall employ a filtration device capable of reducing NEA 
contaminants to less than specified in FAR 25.831, if the FTIS originating 
source of NEA is atmospheric. 
FAR 25.831 spec requires 
HEPA filter.  Not 
necessary for onboard 
storage method (FTIS 
Arch. #1) 
Traces to: BA-500-10 
FTIS -002 The system shall monitor the NEA percentage of oxygen during each flight, 
to ensure compliance with inerting certification levels. 
Traces to: BA-500-01, BA-
500-15 
FTIS -003 The combined weight of all FTIS components shall not exceed 75 lbs. Traces to: BA-500-07 
FTIS -004 The system shall not include any flight deck controls, including an on/off 
switch. 
Traces to: BA-500-13, BA-
500-01 
Allowing crew control could 
jeopardize constant 
inerting. 
FTIS -005 Power for all electrical FTIS components, valve on/off and flow control shall 
be provided by a microprocessor or microcontroller working in conjunction 
with solid-state devices. 
Traces to: BA-500-12 
Solid-state devices are 
necessary for handling the 
valve solenoid currents. 
FTIS -006 The FTIS shall not contain electromechanical devices such as micro 
switches or relays. 
Traces to: BA-500-12 
Bombardier’s concern is 
with system reliability so 
Hall-effect sensors may be 
necessary for detecting 
valve position. 
FTIS -007 The FTIS development team shall minimize system volume by utilizing 
CATIA in a shared Bombardier database. 








Tracing and Notes 
FTIS -008 All FTIS valve mounts shall contain dampening material to minimize 
transmitted vibrations. 
Traces to: BA-500-09 
FTIS -009 If the system architecture includes utilizing air at temperatures higher than 
200 °C, the FTIS shall include a heat exchanger and cooling fan 
supplemented with ram air. 
Traces to: BA-500-14, BA-
500-04 
FTIS -010 If the system architecture includes OEA and /or heat exchanger exhaust, 
both shall be combined in an outlet port located in a low-pressure zone just 
aft of the belly fairing.  
Traces to: BA-500-11 
Both OEA and HX exhaust 
are capable of injuring 
ground personnel. 
FTIS -011 If the system architecture includes utilizing bleed air from the aircraft’s main 
engines, the FTIS shall be capable of temporary shutdown during in-flight 
restarts with wing anti-ice activated. 
Traces to: BA-500-03 
FTIS -012 If the system architecture includes utilizing air at temperatures higher than 
200 °C, the FTIS shall include temperature sensing and control sufficient 
for exceeding reliability of 10-9. 
Traces to: BA-500-06 
Combined reliability of 
temperature sensors, A/D 
converters, microprocessor 
and control circuit provides 
just 10-7 reliability.  Two 
completely independent 
sensing/control blocks are 
needed. 
FTIS -013 All FTIS components shall be designed to provide 15% inerting margin. Traces to: BA-500-08 
FTIS -014 The system shall communicate with aircraft systems such as the air data 
system for FTIS flow control. 








Tracing and Notes 
FTIS -015 The system shall communicate with aircraft systems such as the air supply 
system and landing gear system for FTIS mode control. 
Traces to: BA-500-03, BA-
500-13 
Not necessary for onboard 





Requirements Trace Matrix 
Table 2 provides a concise traceability matrix between the customer requirements and their allocation to system 
requirements. 
Table 2: Customer to System Requirement Tracing 
Customer Requirement System Requirement(s) 
BA-500-01 FTIS-002, FTIS -004 
BA-500-02 FTIS-007 
BA-500-03 FTIS-011, FTIS-015 








BA-500-12 FTIS-005, FTIS-006 







This section of this Thesis paper shall attempt to explain the reasoning behind 
the flowdown (decomposition) from customer requirements to system requirements.  
This discussion is commonly expected by auditors of the system certification process, 
typically at the aircraft manufacturer (customer) level but can also be examined by the 
certification authorities. 
An important characteristic of the customer requirements is none of them direct 
the system supplier to a particular system architecture nor an implementation of a 
specific technology.  Just one customer requirement approaches a directive to an 
architecture or a technology: BA-500-11: The FTIS waste exhaust shall be designed to 
safely discharge O2 enriched air, water drainage or heat exchanger air in a manner safe 
for personnel working around or servicing the aircraft.  This requirement was written 
with the assumption that if the system supplier utilizes a system architecture which does 
not include FTIS waste exhaust in the form of any of the three listed in the requirement, 
then the requirement doesn’t need to be complied with because it doesn’t apply to the 
selected system architecture.   
A fundamental step in developing system requirements from customer 
requirements, known as decomposing or flowing-down the requirements (as per ARP-
4754A), is identifying stakeholders.  A stakeholder is any entity or person having a 
vested interest in the system being developed which can range from the end-user to the 
company sponsoring the project and on to the certifying authorities.  For this Thesis 
paper, the identified stakeholders are: the certifying authority, in this case Transport 
Canada; the customer, Bombardier; the end-users, identified in the Use Case diagrams 
as aircraft owner/operator; and last but not least, the FTIS manufacturer. 
21 
 
Customer-level requirements may be driven by many constraints and priorities 
such as physical limits, FARs, lessons learned, safety considerations and business 
goals.  The system-level requirements these customer-level requirements are 
decomposed into must focus on stakeholders.  To the system engineer, meeting a 
safety-driven requirement is just as important as complying with a functional 
requirement, even though from a system certification standpoint the safety 
considerations carry the most criticality and cannot be ignored.  When choosing 
between various system architectures, one system-level requirement should not be 
weighted more or less than any other; all system-level requirements carry the same 
importance. 
More important than competing to meet as many system-level requirements as 
possible is the necessity to meet all customer-level requirements, if this is possible for 
any system architecture.  Utilizing use case diagrams to determine the optimal system 
architecture is on the critical path to resolving this thesis’ problem statement. 
A summary comparison of the three architectures’ requirement coverage is given 








The following use case diagrams will graphically demonstrate the requirement 
“holes” in each system architecture by modeling the respective system’s context.  In 
each use case diagram all system requirements are displayed with a link to every 
stakeholder.  If a requirement is shown without a corresponding link, that requirement is 
not met by that system architecture.  A table containing a tally of the customer-level 
requirements met by each architecture and then a sum of requirements met will be used 
to rank each architecture. 
In section 7.5.3.4 of SysML for Systems Engineering13, authors Jon Holt and 
Simon Perry assert that a requirement, represented by a use case, which has no 
connection to an Actor can only be explained by four reasons, as shown in Figure 6: 
  
13 SysML for Systems Engineering © 2008 The Institution of Engineering and Technology 
23 
 
                                            
 
 
Figure 6: Use Case to Actor Relationship, per Holt & Perry 
 
This thesis paper will add a fifth reason, which is: the requirement is not covered 
by the chosen system architecture.
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Figure 7: FTIS Architecture #1 Use Case Diagram: Onboard Storage  
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Figure 8: FTIS Architecture #2 Use Case Diagram: Bleed Air  
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Figure 9: FTIS Architecture #3 Use Case Diagram: Compressor  
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Use Case Summary 
So, of what use are use case diagrams?  For this study of competing FTIS 
architectures, the use case diagram provides a quickly recognizable graphic of which 
system architecture complies with the most system requirements.  But complying with 
system requirements are only part of the requirements analysis, as complying with all 
the customer-level requirements is the true goal of supplying a system to the customer. 
The use case diagrams in this thesis paper show the links to system-level 
requirements because those are the requirements to which each system architecture is 
designed.  With each customer-level requirement possibly covered by multiple system-
level requirements, each FTIS architecture has more than one graphical opportunity to 
display compliance with a particular customer-level requirement. 
In the following Requirements Summary tables, a customer requirement is 
considered to be complied with only if all system-level requirements that trace to it are 
either met or not applicable. 
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by this architecture 
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Customer requirements not complied with     2 
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A Block Definition Diagram (BDD) for each FTIS architecture is included in Figure 
10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 to model the structural aspects of each type of system. 
Per the authoritative SysML for Systems Engineering, page 91: “Block definition 
diagrams realize a structural aspect of the model of a system and show what 
conceptual ‘things’ exist in a system and what relationships exist between them”.  BDDs 
are used in this paper because they are the quickest method of portraying the varying 
levels of complexity between FTIS types.  Comparing the BDD of FTIS Architecture #1, 
Onboard Storage, with the other two types that use an ASM, the lower complexity of 
FTIS Architecture #1 is immediately apparent.   
An Internal Block Diagram (IBD) of each FTIS Architecture’s electronic controller 
is used to illustrate the large difference in structural complexity between controllers that 
would be used in each of the FTIS types.  For the IBDs, which show the parts utilized 
within the Controlling block, the contrast between system types is not as striking, 
although a closer look at the IBDs reveals the Controlling element of Architecture #2 
contains the most complexity. 
The BDDs and IBDs for this thesis paper were created by the author using 
Microsoft Visio 2010 and a shapes stencil (a .vss file) obtained from the Object 
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Figure 10: FTIS Architecture #1 Block Diagram: Onboard Storage 
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System complexity is a large consideration in choosing an aircraft system architecture, for many reasons.  The 
most obvious to the majority of readers of this paper is a lower system complexity means a lower parts count, which in 
turn means higher system reliability and lower supply chain costs.  Better reliability and lower costs are great for any 
industry’s systems, but in aviation an airborne system must meet safety requirements before all others.  For example, one 
of the first steps in designing a new aircraft is creating a System Functional Hazard Assessment (SFHA).  This is done by 
the aircraft manufacturer with oversight from the certifying authorities.  An example SHFA is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: System Functional Hazard Assessment for an FTIS 
 
Function: Provide Temperature Limited Nitrogen Enriched Air to Fuel Tanks 
Type of Hazard Flight 
Phase 
Effect on Aircraft Pilot 
Recognition 
Method 




loss of sufficient 
nitrogen 
enriched air 
supply to the 
fuel tank 
ALL Reduction in oxygen 
displacement capability 
from the fuel tank resulting 
in slight increase of 
flammability exposure within 
the given tank 





loss of sufficient 
nitrogen 
enriched air 
supply to the 
fuel tank 
ALL Reduction in oxygen 
displacement capability 
from the fuel tank resulting 
in slight increase of 
flammability exposure within 






Function: Limit the rate of Nitrogen Enriched Air supply into fuel tanks to prevent over pressurization of fuel 
Type of Hazard Flight 
Phase 
Effect on Aircraft Pilot 
Recognition 
Method 
Pilot Action Criticality Safety 
Require
ment 
Supply of high 
pressure air to 
the fuel tank 
ALL Slight airflow rate change 
within the fuel 
tank with no effect on 
system operation 
None None MINOR 1.00E-
05 
Function: Provide High Temperature Protection of Nitrogen Enriched Air supply to the fuel tanks 
Type of Hazard Flight 
Phase 
Effect on Aircraft Pilot 
Recognition 
Method 





air to the fuel 
tank 





Function: Prevent Reverse Flow of fuel or fuel vapor from the fuel tanks into the FTIS 
Type of Hazard Flight 
Phase 
Effect on Aircraft Pilot 
Recognition 
Method 







in contact with 
ignition sources 




The FAA14 provides the following criticality guidance for airborne systems:  
Criticality Definitions: 
• Catastrophic: failure conditions that are expected to result in multiple 
fatalities of the occupants, or incapacitation or fatal injury to a flight 
crewmember normally with the loss of the airplane 
• Minor: failure conditions that would not significantly reduce airplane safety 
and involve crew actions that are within their capabilities 
Frequency of Occurrence: 
• Catastrophic: must be Extremely Improbable with Events per Hour 
occurring less than once during one billion flight hours (1x10-9) 
• Minor: must be Remotely Probable with Events per Hour occurring less 
than once during one hundred thousand flight hours (1x10-5) 
 
An avionics certification reference guide used widely at Honeywell Aerospace15 
quotes the FAA on page 4-15: “the probability should be established as a risk per hour 
in a flight where the duration is equal to the expected mean flight time and for the 
airplane.  For example, in systems where the hazard results from multiple failures in the 
same flight, the numerical assessment should take account of the likelihood that this will 
occur in a flight of expected average duration.  Similarly, in those cases where failures 
are only critical for a particular period of flight, the hazard may be averaged over the 
whole of the expected mean flight time”.  This statement from the FAA is intended to 
14 FAA Advisory Circular 23.1309-1A 
15 Validating Digital Systems in Avionics and Flight Control, Avionics Communications Inc., 1993 
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give some relief to suppliers of systems that don’t operate throughout the entire flight 
regime, an example is a landing gear system.   
In the case of inerting systems, the percentage of flight time that the FTIS 
operates is determined by the aircraft manufacturer and based on the aircraft’s 
construction.  For aircraft of conventional construction, such as the Boeing 747, the 
wing (and therefore the fuel tanks) is formed by sheets of aluminum attached to ribs and 
spars.  The aluminum “skin” of the wing conducts heat so well that during flight, where 
the Outside Air Temperature16 at cruise altitude of 35,000 feet is typically -55°C, there is 
little need to add nitrogen to the ullage because the fuel tanks have been inerted by the 
low temperatures.  As per FAR 25.1309 Appendix N17 which governs the requirements 
for conducting fuel tank flammability exposure analyses for Transport Category Aircraft: 
“For fuel tanks installed in aluminum wings, a qualitative assessment is sufficient if it 
substantiates that the tank is a conventional unheated wing tank”.  In other words, just 
the fact the aircraft’s fuel tank is located in an aluminum wing means that tank is 
considered inerted by virtue of its exposure to low temperatures and no additional 
inerting (such as Nitrogen) is required.  This statement in Appendix N allows aircraft of 
conventional construction to get by with adding an inerting system just for the center 
fuel tank, which is the tank that exploded in the TWA 800 Boeing 747. 
In the case of more modern aircraft, such as the Bombardier CSeries or Boeing’s 
787, the wing is constructed of a carbon fiber composite material which acts like a 
Thermos bottle and maintains a relatively high fuel temperature.  Realizing that one of 
the disadvantages to a carbon fiber wing is higher average fuel temperatures, 
16 Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, Federal Aviation Administration, 2009 
17 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14, Chapter I, Subchapter C, Part 25, Subpart I, Appendix N 
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Bombardier added the following requirement to its customer requirements document: 
BA-500-04: The FTIS shall be capable of providing NEA during any aircraft operating 
phase.  Because the trend in new aircraft design is toward more efficient but more 
insulative composites such as carbon fiber, for this study of various FTIS architectures it 
will be assumed the inerting system will be operational throughout all flight phases. 
To meet the criticality requirements listed in the sample SFHA, fuel tank inerting 
systems and their safety features must be extremely reliable.  FTIS safety features 
include pressure and temperature sensors, safety valves, check valves, j-trap and 
certain software algorithms in the controller.  These safety-related items are seen in the 
Block Definition Diagrams; Figures 10, 11, and 12. 
Development and Design Assurance Levels 
For an airborne system function to be considered as meeting a particular 
reliability number, such as only one failure allowed in one hundred thousand flight hours 
(1x10-5), a safety study must be performed per ARP-476118.  This safety study will 
assign a Function Development Assurance Level (FDAL) to each component in the 
system.  For software development the process requirements outlined in DO-178B19 
must be strictly followed, which involves a large number of process documents for 
higher criticality levels and at least four FAA audits.  DO-178B carries five Item Design 
Assurance Levels (IDAL), shown in Table 7.  In accordance with Section 5.2.3 of 
ARP4754A these IDALs must align with the FDALs determined by the ARP4761 safety 
18 SAE Aerospace ARP4761: Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment 
19 Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, Radio Technical 
Commission on Aeronautics, Document 178 Revision B 
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analysis.  This table contains criticality descriptions quoted from another Avionics 
Communications20 publication utilized by Honeywell Aerospace for avionics certification. 









A Catastrophic Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe 
flight and landing 
B Hazardous Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of 
the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse 
operating conditions to the extent that there would be: 
1. A large reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities OR 
2. Physical distress or higher workload such 
that the flight crew could not be relied on to 
perform their tasks accurately or complexly OR 
3. Adverse effects on occupants including 
serious or potentially fatal injuries to a small 
number of those occupants 
C Major Failure conditions which would  reduce the capability of 
the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse 
operating conditions to the extent that there would be: 
1. A significant reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities OR 
2. A significant increase in crew workload or 
in conditions impairing crew efficiency OR 
3. Discomfort to occupants, possibly including 
injuries. 
20 Performing a Safety Certification for Avionics Components and Systems, Avionics 
Communications, Inc, 1995 
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D Minor Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce 
aircraft safety and which would involve crew actions that 
are well within their capabilities.  Minor failure conditions 
may include: 
1. A slight reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities OR 
2. A slight increase in crew workload such as 
routine flight plan changes OR 
3. Some inconvenience to passengers 
E No Effect Failure conditions which do not affect the operational 
capability of the aircraft or increase pilot workload 
 
The three fuel tank inerting systems studied in this thesis paper would be 
assigned different FDALs and IDALs: 
• Architecture #1: Onboard Storage – FDAL/IDAL D 
Minor Criticalities: 
o Unannunciated loss of sufficient nitrogen enriched air supply to the fuel tank 
o Annunciated loss of sufficient nitrogen enriched air supply to the fuel tank 
o Supply of high pressure air to the fuel tank 
• Architecture #2: Bleed Air – FDAL/IDAL A 
Minor Criticalities: 
o Unannunciated loss of sufficient nitrogen enriched air supply to the fuel tank 
o Annunciated loss of sufficient nitrogen enriched air supply to the fuel tank 





o Supply of unregulated hot air to the fuel tank 
o Reverse airflow causing fuel vapors coming in contact with ignition sources 
• Architecture #3: Compressor – FDAL/IDAL A 
Minor Criticalities: 
o Unannunciated loss of sufficient nitrogen enriched air supply to the fuel tank 
o Annunciated loss of sufficient nitrogen enriched air supply to the fuel tank 
o Supply of high pressure air to the fuel tank 
Catastrophic Criticality: 
o Reverse airflow causing fuel vapors coming in contact with ignition sources 
The Onboard Storage method (Architecture #1) gets a large relief from the SFHA 
criticalities because neither of the Catastrophic hazards apply to this type of system;  
“Supply of unregulated hot air to the fuel tank” does not apply because this architecture 
does not utilize a source of hot air, and “Reverse airflow causing fuel vapors coming in 
contact with ignition sources” does not apply because a source of ignition (the oxygen 
sensor used in the other architectures) isn’t necessary in the Onboard Storage method.  
The ARP4761 safety analysis assigns an FDAL of D to this architecture.  The software 
IDAL will follow suit with an IDAL D, per DO-178B. 
The Bleed Air method of generating NEA on board the aircraft (Architecture #2) 
is assigned an A FDAL because Section 5.2.1 of ARP4754A provides the following 
assignment principle: “If a Catastrophic Failure Condition (FC) could result from a 
possible development error in an aircraft/system function or item, then the associated 
Development Assurance process is assigned level A”.  The ARP4761 safety analysis 
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finds that either software or hardware failures in this system architecture could result in 
both of the SFHA-identified Catastrophic FCs therefore this architecture receives an 
FDAL/IDAL of A. 
The Compressor method of generating NEA on board the aircraft (Architecture 
#3) is likewise assigned an A FDAL/IDAL because the ARP4761 safety analysis finds 
that either software or hardware failures in this system architecture could result in the 
SFHA-identified Catastrophic FC of “Reverse airflow causing fuel vapors coming in 
contact with ignition sources”.   
This FC is identified as a failure hazard for both the Onboard Storage and 
Compressor FTIS Architectures because they both utilize an oxygen sensor to check 
that the oxygen concentration of the NEA exiting the ASM is below the level required to 
maintain an inert fuel tank.  Within the oxygen sensor is a Zirconium sensor element 
that operates at 700°C which will ignite jet fuel or vapors from the fuel tank. 
FDAL/IDAL Contribution to System Development Level of Effort 
As per ARP4754A, the development of each FTIS component must be 
accompanied by documentation according to its FDAL/IDAL, hereafter referred to 
simply as DAL.  Table 8 is an example of the differences in the required Validation 



















PASA/PSSA R R A N 
Validation Plan R R A N 
Validation 
Matrix 
R R A N 
Validation 
Summary 





















A A N 
Engineering 
Review 
R A N 
R - Recommended for certification, A - As negotiated for certification, N - Not required for certification 
Other sets of documents required or not required, according to the component’s 
DAL, by ARP4754A are Safety Assessment Process, Verification Methods and Data, 
Configuration Management Activities, Process Assurance Plans and Reviews, Aircraft 
and System Development Process and Requirements Capture, and Planning Process.  
Documents marked as A (As negotiated for certification) are typically not required from 
well-established aircraft system developers. 
As the governing publication for airborne software development, DO-178B, which 
mimics ARP4754A in its process requirements methodology, has an additional and very 
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large list of documentation that is necessary to produce.  Adhering to the DO-178B 
process is necessary for every component that contains software.   
Another RTCA publication is DO-254, which is virtually identical to DO-178B but 
is intended to apply to Complex Electronic Hardware (CEH) which can fulfill the same 
function a microprocessor (or microcontroller) executing software.  The CEH is loaded 
with operational code just once, vs. a microprocessor which continuously cycles through 
code that was loaded into electronic memory.  The intent of both DO-178B and DO-254 
is to assure the certifying authorities that a sufficient level of rigor was applied during the 
software development process that the reliability number (such as 10-9 failures per flight 
hour) assigned to that software is ensured.  Because DO-178B and DO-254 require the 
same level of documentation effort, an FTIS component that contains both a 
microprocessor and a CEH device will double the considerable amount of development 
and process documentation necessary.  For a DAL D component this level of effort 
could be reasonable but for a DAL A or B it likely would be considered onerous. 
These RTCA and SAE process documents and their resulting activity 
requirements, such as safety studies, software audits, independent reviews, peer 
reviews, environmental tests, etc., have a multiplicative effect on the level of effort 
required for FAA certification.  In the book Avionics Certification21 (Chapter 28: Cost 
Estimation and Metrics), Vance Hilderman and Tony Baghai describe DAL D 
certification as having hardly any additional effort than a non-certified project because 
DAL D is comprised almost entirely of normal industry standard engineering principles.  
DAL C, B and A increase project development cost by 60% to 80%, claim Hilderman 
21 Avionics Certification, V. Hilderman & T. Baghai, 2007 
50 
 
                                            
and Baghai, which they point out is the industry average.  Presumably the author’s 
opinion is that the DAL C increase is 60% and for DAL A the increase is 80%.  Appendix 
A, B and C contain tables from ARP4754A, DO-178B, and DO-254 that list which 
documents are recommended (required) for each DAL. 
A tally of the ARP4754A required documents has DAL D at 15 and DAL A at 47, 
with 18 of these subject to an independent process requirement.  Process 
independence entails adding a resource to the project, further increasing system 
development costs.  An example of process independence is given in Section 5.4.5 of 
ARP4754A, Validation Rigor: “The most common means of achieving independence in 
requirements validation is an independent review of requirement data and supporting 
rationale to determine if there is sufficient evidence to argue the correctness of a 
requirement and the completeness of a set of requirements”.  Process independence for 
other ARP4754A required documentation is similar.   
For DO-178B, required documents total 80 For DAL A, including 25 that require 
process independence while DAL D needs just 38 documents and only 2 are subject to 
the independence requirement.  The DO-254 documentation requirements are fewer, 
but with similar proportions: 27 required documents for DAL A and 13 for DAL D plus 3 
partial document requirements.  For DO-254 no process independence is necessary. 
In addition to the various DALs requiring different levels of effort in the numbers 
of documents, as the documents are produced they are subject to different levels of 
Configuration Management (CM) controls, categorized as System Control 1 or System 
Control 2 for ARP4754A and shown in Table 9.  Table 10 contains the software CM 
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controls required by DO-178B and Table 11 has the similar hardware controls for DO-
254.   
Table 9: CM Activities to Control Category Mapping for ARP4754A 
CM Process Activity System Control Category 1 System Control Category 2 




Problem Reporting X  
Change Control – Integrity 
assurance 
X X 




Archive and Retrieval X X 
 
Table 10: SCM Activities to Control Category Mapping for DO-178B 
SCM Process Activity Software Control Category 
1 
Software Control Category 
2 
Configuration Identification X X 
Baseline(s)  X  
Traceability X X 
Problem Reporting X  
Change Control – Integrity 
and Identification 
X X 











Release X  




Table 11: HCM Activities to Control Category Mapping for DO-254 




Configuration Identification X X 
Baseline(s)  X  
Baseline Traceability X X 
Problem Reporting X  
Change Control – Integrity 
and Identification 
X X 
Change Control – 
Records, Approvals and 
Traceability 
X  
Release X  
Archive and Retrieval X X 








As shown in the Appendices, even DAL D requires some amount of CM but as 
can be expected, DAL A requires a much higher level of CM effort.  Of the 47 
documents ARP4754A requires for a DAL A system, 20 are expected to adhere to 
Control Category (CC) 1 standards and the other 27 are subject to CC 2.  DAL D 
system documentation, per ARP4754A, has just 2 documents under CC1 and 13 under 
CC2.  For DAL A software documents (DO-178B), 26 use CC1 SCM process activities 
and the other 54 use CC2 while DAL D software documents have 10 using CC1 and 28 
using CC2.  Dal A hardware documents are divided into 10 for CC1, 17 for CC2 and for 







This thesis paper has examined two major aspects of developing an FTIS: 
requirements compliance and system complexity.  Fifteen customer-level requirements 
from the Bombardier CSeries commercial airliner program were analyzed for each of 
three FTIS architectures.  For system complexity, Design and Development Assurance 
Levels were utilized to arrive at a quantifiable comparison.   
Customer Requirements Coverage 
The score for each system architecture’s ability to meet customer requirements is 
shown in Table 12. 











Complied With 9 14 13 
Not Applicable 4 0 0 
Not Complied 
With 
2 1 2 
 
All three systems fail to meet this customer-level requirement: BA-500-12: The 
FTIS shall be controlled by solid-state devices.  In the requirements decomposition 
process this requirement was flowed down to two system-level requirements; FTIS-005: 
Power for all electrical FTIS components, valve on/off and flow control shall be provided 
by a microprocessor or microcontroller working in conjunction with solid-state devices 
and FTIS-006: The FTIS shall not contain electromechanical devices such as micro 
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switches or relays.  All three FTIS architectures comply with FTIS-005 but not FTIS-006, 
therefore all three fail to comply with BA-500-12. 
The reason FTIS-006 is not met by any of these FTIS architectures is they all 
contain valves that utilize micro switches for valve position feedback.   Shown in the 
Tracing and Notes column of Table 1, for FTIS-006, is this comment “Bombardier’s 
concern is with system reliability so Hall-effect sensors may be necessary for detecting 
valve position”.  This comment would have been recorded during a system design 
review held with the customer, in this case Bombardier, which is part of the process of 
flowing down (decomposing) customer requirements to system requirements.   
Unfortunately, very high levels of electromagnetic environmental tests are being 
imposed on newly designed aircraft that utilize composite construction, such as carbon 
fiber, because composites do not shield against this type of energy as well as metal.  
The Hall-effect sensors that Bombardier wanted to see included in the valves’ design 
were adversely affected during these environmental tests and had to be replaced with 
mechanical micro switches even though this violated BA-500-12.  In this case, the 
customer will have to consider the requirement as partially complied with and not reject 
any of the FTIS architectures because of it. 
The customer-level requirement that Architectures #1 & #3 are not in compliance 
with is BA-500-07: The FTIS system Guaranteed Not to Exceed Weight (GNTEW) 
shall not exceed 75 lbs dry weight (structures mounting bracketry not included).  This 
requirement can only be met by an on-board Nitrogen generating FTIS that connects to 
a readily available source of hot and relatively clean pressurized air, which is 
Architecture #2.  This weight advantage is why aircraft manufacturers such as Airbus, 
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Boeing, Bombardier, COMAC and Sukhoi have chosen Architecture #2 for their latest 
commercial aircraft, even while the durability of HFM technology is not yet proven. 
System Complexity 
A system safety analysis was performed for each FTIS architecture with this 
result: 
• Architecture #1: Onboard Storage – DAL D 
• Architecture #2: Bleed Air –  DAL A 
• Architecture #3: Compressor –  DAL A 
Both the system developer and the aircraft manufacturer should carefully 
consider whether the advantage of saving a few pounds of overall system weight can be 
negatively offset by the huge difference in the level of development effort when 
comparing DAL D and DAL A systems.  The differences in documentation and process 
requirements is compiled in Tables 13, 14, and 15. 
Table 13: System Documentation Required per ARP4754A 




Total Number of 
Required 
Documents 
#1: Onboard  Storage 2 13 15 (0 with process 
independence) 
#2: Bleed Air 20 27 47 
(18 with process 
independence) 
#3: Compressor 20 27 47 





Table 14: Software Documentation Required per DO-178B 




Total Number of 
Required 
Documents 
#1: Onboard  Storage 10 28 38 
(2 with process 
independence) 
#2: Bleed Air 26 54 80 
(25 with process 
independence) 
#3: Compressor 26 54 80 
(25 with process 
independence) 
 
Table 15: Hardware Documentation Required per DO-254 




Total Number of 
Required 
Documents 
#1: Onboard  Storage 7 9 16 
#2: Bleed Air 10 17 27 
#3: Compressor 10 17 27 
 
Of all the configuration management activities, Problem Reporting and Change 
Control involve the most resources and a correspondingly high level of effort.  Whether 
the CM is for System, Software or Hardware documentation, the magnitude of these two 
activities causes CC1 to entail at least three times the effort of CC2.  This has been my 
experience at both Honeywell Aerospace and Parker Aerospace, because typically a 
formal Change Control Board (CCB) is assigned to the project to manage these two CM 
activities. 
Because Process Independence requires an independent review of the 
documentation, along with the subsequent back-and-forth between the document’s 
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author and reviewer, a factor of two can be entered for the effort needed to complete all 
documents subject to this requirement.   
Factoring in the CM activities allows a quantifiable approximation of the 
differences in the effort necessary to develop and maintain documentation for each 
FTIS architecture.   
















2(3)=6 13 0 19 
#2: Bleed Air 20(3)=60 27 18(2)=36 123 
#3: Compressor 20(3)=60 27 18(2)=36 123 
 

















10(3)=30 28 2(2)=4 62 
#2: Bleed Air 26(3)=78 54 25(2)=50 182 






















7(3)=21 9 0 30 
#2: Bleed Air 10(3)=30 17 0 47 
#3: Compressor 10(3)=30 17 0 47 
 
As a recap, the following list summarizes the documentation effort for each FTIS 
architecture: 
• Architecture #1: Onboard Storage 
o System – 19 
o Software – 62 
o Hardware – 30 
 Total Documentation Effort = 111 
• Architecture #2: Bleed Air and Architecture #3: Compressor 
o System – 123 
o Software – 182 
o Hardware – 47 
 Total Documentation Effort = 352 
The amount of engineering man-hours required just for documenting 
Architectures #2 or #3 is three times that of Architecture #1, a major consideration for 





Repeated from the Abstract: when choosing a system architecture, requirements 
analysis is often overlooked and documentation workload is brushed aside in favor of 
purely technical analyses.   
This thesis paper has demonstrated why a thorough requirements analysis must 
be performed for each system architecture being considered, early in the project 
management process.  Without this analysis an unknown risk will exist within the project 
that may not be discovered until many thousands of engineering man-hours have been 
expended.  Armed with an analysis of requirements, performed by utilizing the use case 
method demonstrated in this paper, the project’s manager or system engineer can see 
a possible risk event whose impact might be mitigated, possibly by renegotiating the 
requirements with the customer. 
Failing a requirements renegotiation an alternative architecture could be chosen 
relatively quickly if a comparative requirements analysis has been performed; again and 
very importantly, early in the planning stage of the project.  For example, if Architecture 
#1 was initially chosen and the customer refused to give relief on the weight 
requirement that system would not meet, FTIS Architecture #2 could be quickly 
proposed as an alternative provided the non-compliance requirements for that system 
were acceptable to the customer.   
It should be noted here that to maintain focus on the principle being explained, in 
this thesis paper the Bombardier customer-level requirements were kept to the most 
important 15 requirements.  The actual Bombardier BD-500 Inerting System Technical 
Requirements Document numbers 73 pages and contains a few hundred requirements.  
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A thoroughly analyzed requirements matrix of these three FTIS architectures 
undoubtedly would reveal each type of FTIS is non-compliant with at least a few 
customer-level requirements. 
Beyond the risks of developing an FTIS that may not be compliant with customer-
level requirements is the quantifiable difference in each architecture’s level of effort.  An 
experienced project manager or system engineer can easily sum the number of system 
components from a bill of materials and estimate the number of engineering man-hours 
necessary to meet the technical system requirements (usually from previously 
developed similar components) but typically the documentation effort is not given a 
second thought.   
As part of the FTIS architecture selection process, a documentation level of effort 
analysis must also be performed – again early in the project management process.  
This would be a project management advantage if choosing one FTIS architecture over 
another would entail a substantial effort in redesigning or creating a newly designed 
system component.  For example, if choosing Architecture #1 required a large level of 
effort to design a new method of LN2 storage this could be justified (i.e. offset) by the 
much lower level of engineering effort in producing the required documentation.   
Recommendations  
Gathering an understanding of the various FTIS architectures from the reference 
materials used while researching for this thesis paper, the following recommendations 
can be made: 
• Architecture #1: Onboard Storage.  Best for aircraft expected to have rapid 
descents as part of the normal flight regime.  This can include aircraft 
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involved with military operations or commuter jets striving for maximum 
efficiency, since a jet-powered aircraft is much more efficient with fuel 
while at a cruising altitude.  Additional advantages are the least complexity 
and the lowest level of documentation effort. 
• Architecture #2: Bleed Air.  Best at fulfilling the civil transport aircraft 
manufacturer’s two most critical requirements: low system weight and 
meeting the FAR 25.981 inerting thresholds.  If Monte Carlo analysis 
shows this FAR can be met with a single ASM, this architecture will be the 
consistent winner.  Disadvantages are high system complexity and level of 
documentation effort. 
• Architecture #3: Compressor.  Midway between the other two FTIS 
architectures with less weight that Architecture #1 and less complexity 
than Architecture #2.  May be the FTIS architecture of choice if the 
aircraft’s bleed air system cannot supply enough bleed air flow or 
pressure.  Disadvantage is a level of documentation effort matching 
Architecture #2. 
A trend toward higher fuel efficiency in modern airliners may make choosing 
between FTIS Architectures easier.  Tapping bleed air from a turbine engine reduces its 
power output slightly so allocation of this precious source of hot pressurized air to the 
various aircraft systems requiring it is carefully controlled.  Some of these systems need 
the (greater than) 200°C heat energy, such as the wing anti-ice system, but the 
compressor in FTIS Architecture #3 provides enough heat energy from the heat of 
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compression to operate an ASM adequately.  As the airliner manufacturers become 
stingier with bleed air, the viability of FTIS Architecture #2 begins to fail. 
Another airliner trend is less main engine operating time to save fuel.  An 
auxiliary engine, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), is utilized while the airliner is parked at 
the boarding gate being prepared for flight.  The APU is a very small turbine engine, just 
large enough to power some electrical systems such as cabin air conditioning.  The 
predicted trend is to also depend on just the APU while the aircraft is moved to the end 
of the runway, either by a tow vehicle or by electric motors within the wheels.  
Honeywell recently demonstrated an electric taxi system22 in Toulouse, France on an 
Airbus A320 where the expectation is that environmental regulations will not allow main 
engine taxi operations within a few years at some European Union airports.  Because 
an APU cannot provide adequate bleed air pressure to operate an ASM, the trending 
practices of airline operation will drive the need for FTIS Architecture #3 over #2. 
At the time this thesis paper was written, in 2014, the Bleed Air method of FTIS 
Architecture #2 was most popular among the major airliner manufacturers because it 
met their needs.  Changes in environmental regulation, an increasing price of jet fuel, or 
alterations in an airline’s operations could easily increase the viability of either the 
Compressor or On Board Storage methods of maintaining inerted fuel tanks in airliners. 
  
22 http://www.greentaxiing.com/: Introducing EGTS™, the future of aircraft taxiing 
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APPENDIX A: ARP4754A PROCESS OBJECTIVES DATA AND SYSTEM CONTROL CATEGORIES23 
  
23 Excerpted from: SAE Aerospace ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems 
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24 Excerpted from: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, 
Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics, Document 178 Revision B 
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APPENDIX C: DO-254 HARDWARE LIFE CYCLE DATA AND HARDWARE CONTROL CATEGORIES25 
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